Sunday 21 July 2013

Why stay in the Euro anyway?

What are the advantages of being part of the Euro? This is the question many people, especially in Southern Europe, start to ask these days. The typical answer revolves around the following arguments:

1. The Euro eliminates transaction costs related to currency conversion from which both companies and consumers benefit

2. It enhances price transparency of goods and services across the Eurozone creating more competition among companies from which all Eurozone citizens (consumers) are beneficiaries

3. It eliminates exchange rate risk, which allows for a higher degree of certainty in terms of investment planning and fuels cross-border investments

4. It allows to smooth the disruptive impact of financial crisis by avoiding overnight currency devaluations and allowing Eurozone banks to access ECB's refinancing mechanisms

5.......and we could go on with more technical arguments along the lines of the previous ones

They are all valid arguments. And the perfect example of the adverse consequences of too much focus on detail and complete lack of big picture thinking: in the big scheme of things these arguments are, on aggregate, valid but irrelevant. Peanuts.

The overwhelming reason to be part of the Euro is another one: a sustainable and continuous rise in living standards.

Let's see why:

1. The only way to increase living standards sustainably over time (which necessarily involves increasing real salaries sustainably over time) is via a continuous increase in productivity

2. A continuous increase in productivity requires continuous investment in both human capital (formal education, training / re-training on the job) and physical capital

3. What to do to incentivise companies to continuously invest in human and physical capital?  Simple: put them under constant competitive pressure. Only constant competitive pressure will force them to be innovative, come up with new and distinctive products, improve their production processes and reduce unit production costs. All of which, in turn, require a continuous re-investment of part of the annual profits generated in the business, i.e., in human and physical capital.

4. How to put companies under constant competitive pressure? By having a "strong currency". Meaning: a stable currency, that doesn't devalue as soon as there is some loss in the countries external competitiveness. The moment that the corporate sector realizes that it will not benefit from currency devaluation to restore potential losses in competitiveness, it will do everything it can not to lose competitiveness in the first place. And therefore, instead of paying out the entire annual profits in dividends to buy a few new Ferraris and yachts, entrepreneurs will reinvest part of the profits in their businesses. In human and physical capital.

Over a 1 or 2-year period buying another Ferrari or reinvesting part of the profits in human and physical capital won't make a big difference. Over a 10-period the difference will be like day and night. It will be the difference between a country with unchanged living standards, relying on currency devaluations to stay competitive, and a country with highly competitive and innovative companies able to pay high and rising salaries to its well-educated and well-trained workforce.

5. How to "create" a strong currency? Have a fully independent central bank whose only mission is to keep price stability. Such a central bank will not be subject to political pressures. Will not monetize public debt. And its single goal of ensuring price stability will translate into a "shadow goal" of exchange rate stability. A "strong currency". Thus, very low exchange rate risk for international investors. This in turn will translate into low interest rates.

In a nutshell: a stable currency ("strong currency") will create i) the incentives for a permanent high level of investment in physical and human capital by the corporate sector and ii) the conditions for these incentives to be materialised by generating a low interest rate environment. The mid to long-term result of this mechanism is economic prosperity.

This is THE reason why the Euro should be embraced by the citizens of its member countries.

But let's not fool ourselves: short-term, staying in the Euro will continue to impose heavy pain on Eurozone's peripheral countries. However, the fact that a currency devaluation is not an option, is building up a phenomenal amount of pressure on the countries to reform. Without the option of a currency devaluation, mismanagement by the political-administrative apparatus becomes suddenly very obvious and visible. The pressure to change the system is there and will not go away. The system's "fat cats" are and will continue to be under fire. This is very good news.

Especially when taking into account the power of history in shaping the future: countries, political systems, corporate cultures don't change easily. Just like people's behaviour doesn't change easily. For change in behaviour to happen powerful incentives have to be put in place.

The Euro is the most powerful incentive mechanism for change that Eurozone deficit countries could wish for. With it in place, structural change and a break with the past "modus operandi" are real possibilities. The younger generations being the main beneficiaries of it.

Boys and girls, the Euro is your friend. Embrace it!



PS Ludwig Erhard, Germany's legendary post-war II economics minister (1949 - 1963) always defended vehemently a politically absolute independent central bank (Bundesbank) and a stable currency ("the strong Deutsche Mark"). Now we all know why: to keep the competitive pressure high on the German industry and eventually rise German citizens living standards. Sixty years later, we all know the results.

Tuesday 2 July 2013

Eurozone periphery: one deficit that counts. And the coalition of the unwilling

A popular view these days is that Eurozone's peripheral countries will not consider leaving the Euro as long as they run a public primary deficit (deficit before interest payments). Leaving the Euro would force them to adjust their public finances even faster than staying in the Euro as they would be suddenly cut off from international financial markets and unable to finance the public deficit. It would be austerity at the power of 2. As soon as the primary public deficit is eliminated, however, leaving the Euro will become a serious option. No additional adjustment in public spending would be needed and the devaluation of the new local currency relative to the Euro would quickly improve external competitiveness allowing for a speedier economic recovery.

As popular as it might be, the focus on the public (primary) deficit is misplaced. Analysts are looking at the wrong deficit. The deficit that counts is not the public one. It is the external one: the current account deficit.

This is why:

1. If a country decides to leave the Euro and re-introduce its local currency, it will be easily able to finance its public deficit. Not matter how large it is. The central bank can buy as much government issued debt as needed to finance the deficit. It's classic public deficit monetisation at work.

2. What the central bank cannot do is to finance the country's external deficit. For that to happen it would have to be able to issue foreign currency (Euro or USD) to pay for the "excess imports" of goods and services - something it cannot do. This means that leaving the Euro while running a current account deficit would force the country to immediately cut down its level of imports. Given that many of the imports are of an essential nature (energy, pharmaceutical products, chemicals, equipment) the pain would be felt straight away. Capital controls would have to be imposed to ensure that essential imports could be financed. The currency would devalue (25%-40% depending on the country). And while the currency devaluation would restore external competitiveness it would take time for its effects to be fully felt (18 to 24 months).

Meaning: leaving the Euro while running a current account deficit would lead to an immediate increase in social discontentment and unrest. Hardly an attractive perspective for any national government considering leaving the Eurozone.

To assess the likelihood of a country leaving the Euro, the relevant question than is: where do the EU's peripheral countries currently stand in terms of current account deficit?

And the answer is: in 2014 all of them are expected (IMF data) to achieve a current account surplus. Ranging from 0%-1% (Greece, Portugal), 1%-2% (Spain) to around 4% (Ireland).

Given that

a) all of them will still be running public deficits in 2014 ranging from 4% (Greece) to 6.5% (Spain)

b) Greece, Portugal and Spain will have to reform their political-administrative apparatus (call it bureaucracies) - including cutting pensions of retired former members of the apparatus - to bring the public deficits sustainably down, reform their tax system and attract foreign direct investment

c) there will be a lot of resistance from the political-administrative apparatus' insiders to reform

the outcome can only be one: a public campaign led by the bureaucracy insiders (countries' local and regional politicians, public servants, organisations with close ties to the public sector) to exit the Euro will gain momentum over the next 18-24 months in Greece, Portugal and Spain. The insiders know that leaving the Euro and monetising the public deficit will enable them to keep the status quo. The fact that the countries are running a current account surplus will further allow them to avoid the disruptions caused by leaving the Euro while running a current account deficit. And thus sell the whole strategy as a way to increase the countries external competitiveness and enable a faster economic recovery to take place.

More remarkable is that they are likely to be joined on their "Euro exit campaign" by the at first sight most unlikely of allies: major shareholders and top management of the countries' financial institutions. Following the EU agreement last Thursday on bank bail-ins, future recapitalisations will be done by wiping out shareholders and debt-to-equity swaps of unsecured debt. Major shareholders of the banks won't be pleased with the new regime. Neither will be their top management as some of it will be replaced once the banks' shareholder structure changes following the bail-ins. Banks' shareholders and top management might not have realised what the new bail-in regime actually means for them. But soon they will.

Once they do, it will become obvious for them that the way to avoid suffering the consequences of the unavoidable bank recapitalisations via bail-ins is for their country to leave the Euro (before 2018, when the bail-in regime becomes mandatory for the whole EU). This will allow the national government to bail banks out with the funds raised by issuing public debt monetised by the central bank.

Public bureaucracy insiders and bankers side by side campaigning for an Euro exit.....what a prospect! Call it the "coalition of the unwilling" (unwilling to bear their share of the costs of structural reform). Like it or not, if you live in Portugal, Spain or Greece you will start very soon to hear from them regularly in the news.

Will the "coalition of the unwilling" succeed in their "Euro exit" attempt? Two powerful barriers will stand in its way:

1. The symbolic value of the Euro for most of the population. People in Southern Europe tend to view the Euro more as a symbol of cultural identity than a currency. Being part of the Euro means being part of modern Europe. This perception will be very difficult to change.

2. Slowly but surely, people in Southern Europe tend to look at the Euro as a protection mechanism against the national/regional public-administrative apparatus. Leaving the Euro would mean giving back the printing press to the apparatus. With all the consequences for discretionary spending and lack of accountability seen in the past. Not a cheerful prospect for most of the population.

Can the "coalition of the unwilling" win nevertheless? As much public visibility and access to the media as it might have, the only plausible way for it to win is by hijacking the "Euro exit" decision process: forming a majority in parliament and take the decision to leave the Euro without consulting the population via a referendum.

Likely to happen? I doubt it. The discontentment with the political system among the population after almost six years of crisis, and uncover of several cases of public funds mismanagement and corruption, is too widespread for the system insiders to get away with it.  Which means that the Euro will prove to be the most powerful instrument for structural reform that Southern Europe has seen for at least 40 years. Call it "institutional Thatcherism" (I know, Mrs. Thatcher wasn't an Euro fan. Then again, who cares?).

All very bad news for the insiders? Yes. But great news for the peripheral countries' younger generations. They will be the main beneficiaries of structural change.

Cheer up, boys and girls of Southern Europe! Your time has come.